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Rethinking Church and 
State 
 
America’s Neutrality-Obsessed Separation, Its 
Formation, Its Compromised State, and the 
Way Forward 
 
Benjamin Giles 
 
eligion has long been a part of political and otherwise public 
life, usually in union with political power. This relationship has 
yielded great benefits for mankind, but it has also produced 
civil strife, religious warfare, and other harms. By the time of the 
American Founding, a new way of approaching this relationship 
emerged, one that sought to keep religious and political power 
separate. This paradigm became ingrained in the American 
consciousness and the federal Constitution after independence, but 
not the state law or American jurisprudence, at least until much later. 
Church-state separation was gradually integrated into these 
institutions over time, where it eventually interacted with liberal 
constitutional principles that seek to keep the government and 
Constitution neutral among ends. As a result, America now has a far 
different conception of church and state separation, where church and 
state are construed as two separate spheres that must not mix. 
Neutrality-obsessed church-state separation, as I will call this new 
conception, represents a fall from grace when compared to the 
Founders’ separation and the separation I will advocate later. The first 
part of this paper traces those changes in American thinking on 
church-state separation that have led to its corruption. 
 
After discussing how America has arrived, this paper will outline the 
challenges, particularly from the Religious Right, that neutrality-
R 
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obsessed church-state separation faces that render it unable to 
function properly before proceeding by outlining the need for a 
church-state relationship of some form. 
 
Finally, this paper lays out a framework of principles for building a 
church-state relationship: a tension between democratic inclusion and 
freedom of religious conscience. The current balance, as this paper 
will argue, too greatly favors democratic inclusion, and so the scales 
must be moved to give greater favor to freedom of religious exercise. 
 
I. The Gradual Formation of America’s Neutrality-Obsessed 
Church-State Separation 
 
The mere concept of separation between secular authority and 
religious authority is clearly a modern phenomenon, since such a 
separation would have been unthinkable for much of world history. 
Edel describes ancient thinking on church and state:  
As tribes grew into nations and more complex political and 
religious organizations evolved, the distinction between 
political and religious decision making sharpened. For 
thousands of years, however, these two processes went hand 
in hand, with little thought given to the separation of church 
and state. On the contrary, any suggestion that the two be 
divorced would have been considered both heretical and 
treasonable: heretical in its challenge to established religious 
doctrine; and treasonous in its challenge to the authority of 
the ruler, whose position was based on the will of the god or 
gods that he and his people worshipped.1 
 
The state of affairs Edel describes prevailed in much of Europe and 
western thought for centuries, with an assortment of related problems. 
For example, England after the split with the Roman Church saw the 
monarch placed at the head of the new Church of England, a fusion of 
religious and secular power that persists to this day. When James II, a 
Catholic, took the English throne in 1685, tension arose that resulted 
                                                 
1 Wilbur Edel, Defenders of the Faith: Religion and Politics from the Pilgrim 
Fathers to Ronald Reagan (New York: Praeger, 1987), 3. 
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in the Glorious Revolution, which deposed James II and placed 
William III, a Dutchman, on the throne. The Revolution might have 
been avoided had the union of English church and state not occurred. 
Since the English settled their North American colonies during this 
time of post-Henry VIII union of church and state, they carried a 
similar model to the New World, at least until the English Civil War. 
 
The colonies formed before the English Civil War followed a model 
of union between secular and religious power that mirrored the 
English. Within England itself: three religious groups dominated 
(with one officially sanctioned church): Anglicans, Puritans, and 
Catholics. Hutson argues that these three groups ultimately shared a 
similar vision for religion and its relationship to the state: “All 
believed that the state must assist the orthodox church in its 
jurisdiction, promoting its doctrines and suppressing dissent from 
them by force, if necessary.2” As these groups began to colonize the 
eastern coast of North America, they took these principles with them. 
The Church of England was the official church in colonial Virginia,3 
and the Puritans built their own quasi-utopian society in 
Massachusetts. In these and other early colonies, the modus operandi 
was to unify religious and secular power under an established church. 
 
That model for colonization changed with the English Civil War, after 
which a new emphasis on pluralism and religious toleration emerged. 
Colonies established after the War possessed a greater degree of 
religious freedom than the older colonies. Among these new colonies 
was Pennsylvania, which became known for its successful use of 
religious pluralism. It was these colonies that could later provide a 
blueprint for the Founders of how religious pluralism could work in a 
society. 4 
 
The dual approach in the colonies created a landscape of church and 
state relations that was by no means uniform, and, in states with 
                                                 
2 James H. Hutson, Church and State in America: The First Two Centuries 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 2. 
3 Ibid., 12–13. 
4 Ibid., 30–31, 38. 
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official churches, contradicted both the thinking of the Founders 
towards church-state separation and modern neutrality-obsessed 
separation. Hutson describes the diverse landscape:  
The religious map of the colonies in 1689 [the founding date 
of the last of the thirteen colonies] resembled Joseph’s coat 
with its multiple hues and colors. In some colonies the state 
compelled obedience to one official church; in others it was 
stripped of all power over citizen’s consciences. There were 
colonies in which religion was regulated in some places but 
not in others. And there were colonies in which the brand of 
religion supported by the state refrained from regulating 
religion but signaled its intention to do so in the future.5 
 
It was within this framework that the colonies functioned into the 
eighteenth century, and it was within this framework that the 
Founders and early American leaders were raised. 
 
The Founders, chief among them Jefferson, supported a positive role 
for religion in democratic society, but were nonetheless concerned 
with limiting religion to keep both it and the state free of corruption. 
Reichley argues that religion was primarily appreciated for its role in 
developing citizens: “Almost all of the principal founders of the 
United States, including Thomas Jefferson, were convinced that the 
health of republican government depends on moral values derived 
from religion.6” Ragosta adds that for Jefferson, “the contribution of 
religion … to the ‘legitimate objects of society’ should not be missed. 
This was a view of long standing with Jefferson and a belief broadly 
shared in early America.7” There is no doubt that the Founders saw 
religion as integral to the republic’s success, yet they also had a clear 
sense that religion would depart from its beneficial role without a 
separation of church and state. Ragosta summarizes Jefferson’s 
                                                 
5 Ibid., 1. 
6 A. James Reichley, Religion in American Public Life (Washington: The 
Brookings Institution, 1985), 340. 
7 John Ragosta, “Thomas Jefferson’s Religion and Religious Liberty,” in 
Religious Freedom: Jefferson’s Legacy, America’s Creed (Charlottesville: 
University of Virginia Press, 2013), 16. 
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thoughts on the matter: “He was convinced that any alliance between 
church and state would prostitute both and undermine the noble 
republican experiment, and it is clear that his concern went to both 
government interference with religion and religion’s interference with 
government.8” Ragosta continues: “Critically, for Jefferson, both true 
religion and the republic depended upon liberty of the mind, including 
full religious liberty. Of necessity, such liberty included separation of 
church and state.9”  
 
An immediate objection may be raised that if Jefferson argued for a 
separation of church and state, then he would be a hypocrite to 
advocate that Americans be taught religious morals. However, this 
objection is framed in a neutrality-obsessed mindset, and as Ragosta 
notes: “He was certainly emphatic that government should neither 
encourage nor endorse religion, but he never sought to purge religion 
… from the public sphere.10” Jefferson was concerned with the 
mixing of religious and secular power structures. He had no issue 
with those in the government and the populace being religious, since 
religion could instill virtues needed to preserve the republic. Such 
principles were enshrined in the First Amendment to the Constitution. 
 
The idea of separation between church and state achieved its first 
constitutional expression in the First Amendment, which was 
carefully designed to keep the federal government from establishing 
religion but also from impeding free exercise of religion so as to 
preserve the purity of both the church and the state. As Michael 
Sandel notes: “The religious interest served by separation is in 
avoiding the corruption that comes with dependence on civil 
authority,” while “the political interest served by separation is in 
avoiding the civil strife that has historically attended church-state 
                                                 
8 Ibid., 35. 
9 Ibid., 39. 
10 John Ragosta, “Federal Control: Jefferson’s Vision in Our Times,” in 
Religious Freedom: Jefferson’s Legacy, America’s Creed (Charlottesville: 
University of Virginia Press, 2013), 170. 
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entanglements.11” A series of interests competed in the formation of 
the First Amendment, since the issue of how the federal government 
interacted with religion would have serious consequences for both 
those states that had established churches and the project of religious 
pluralism. In the end, the First Amendment was formed by a 
compromise that confined its effects to the federal government:  
As previously shown, the First Amendment “compromise” 
was between those who wanted to prevent the federal 
government from interfering with state establishments, but 
were more than happy to restrict federal authority severely; 
those who wanted to keep a distant federal government out 
of people’s lives, and supporters of Jefferson and Madison 
who wanted to prevent government interference in religion 
(sometimes overlapping groups).12 
 
This view of church-state separation, where the federal government 
takes a laissez-faire approach to religion and the states are left more 
or less free to handle religion however they like, persisted until the 
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. During that time, oddly 
enough, the states revoked the official status of their established 
religions.13 Despite this erosion, Americans remained very religious, 
enough so that Alexis de Tocqueville took serious note. Tocqueville’s 
1835 edition of Democracy in America was written in two volumes: 
one devoted to American politics, the other to American civic 
institutions. However, Tocqueville actually planned three volumes: 
the first two as they appeared, and a third on religion in America.14 
American religion continued to inculcate moral values for citizenship, 
and Americans themselves were very proud of both their religion and 
                                                 
11 Michael Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public 
Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 1996), 61, 62. 
12 Ragosta, “Federal Control: Jefferson’s Vision in Our Times,” 182. 
13 Edel, Defenders of the Faith: Religion and Politics from the Pilgrim 
Fathers to Ronald Reagan, 110. 
14 James T. Schleifer, “Tocqueville, Religion, and Democracy in America: 
Some Essential Questions,” American Political Thought 3, no. 2 (Fall 2014): 
254–255. 
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their church-state separation.15 During this period and throughout the 
nineteenth century, church influence in politics steadily waned, but 
the post-Civil War amendments to the Constitution, particularly the 
Fourteenth Amendment, made the federal government and courts 
more involved in American religion. 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment was born of a recognition that the Bill of 
Rights provided for certain rights that may have been protected by the 
federal government, but not state governments. As a result, the 
Amendment was written in such a way that the courts interpreted it to 
extend the protections of the Bill of Rights to individuals when state 
law did not provide those protections.16 This move placed the federal 
government in a position to enforce a whole host of liberties, 
including religious liberty through neutral separation of church and 
state. Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment constitutionalized church-
state separation, previously only a principle in the American mind. 
 
Finally, the Fourteenth Amendment and subsequent judicial rulings 
began a time of further decrease in church influence in the state. 
Eventually, the Amendment and the rulings established the principle 
of aggressive neutrality between church and state. According to 
Michael Sandel, this system of neutrality finally triumphed in 1947, 
and it has persisted since. This system is problematic, as it coincides 
with the liberal value of the person as a freely choosing self.17 Under 
such a conception, all religious activities and beliefs ought to be the 
result of a free choice by an individual, and there is no room for 
beliefs or activities undertaken through duty. Thus, because all 
religious activities must be the result of a free choice by an individual, 
government must ensure complete neutrality between church and 
state. 
 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 257, 258. 
16 Edel, Defenders of the Faith: Religion and Politics from the Pilgrim 
Fathers to Ronald Reagan, 111. 
17 Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public 
Philosophy, 56, 62–63. 
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Now we can see the development of neutrality-obsessed separation, 
which represents a significant departure from the separation in early 
America. In early America, religion was a valuable institution for the 
formation of citizens and political leaders. It inculcated moral duties 
and principles and provided a restraint for excessive political 
passions. Now, as Reichley writes, the situation has changed: “In 
more recent times some Americans have come to regard religion as a 
kind of consumer value, like sports or travel, that should be available 
in a pluralist society but that makes no essential contribution to the 
moral foundation of democracy.18” The role of religion as a 
contributor to the “good objects of society” has eroded, and secular 
value systems have failed to fill religion’s old role. Yet, there are still 
many who feel a longing for a restored role of religion in America, 
and they have taken action towards that end. So, we arrive at the 
current state of dysfunctional tension in church-state separation in 
America: a missing part of the formation of citizens coupled with a 
tension between a conservative movement that seeks to restore 
religion’s old role and other interests that seek to preserve the status 
quo.  
 
II. The Compromised State of Neutrality-Obsessed Church-State 
Separation 
 
In the present day, the liberal effort of the last sixty to seventy years 
to enact neutrality-obsessed church-state separation now faces mixed 
results. In one sense, America’s sacred public centers are no longer 
religious, but civil. American public life is more and more focused 
around malls and other commercial venues, sports stadiums, and 
offices as opposed to churches. This preference for the civil can be 
seen in the fact that Al-Qaeda chose to attack symbols of American 
capitalism and consumerism, American politics, and American 
militarism as opposed to any targets with religious symbolism on 
September 11, 2001.19 In addition, the Supreme Court has regularly 
held that government must be neutral towards religion and vice versa 
                                                 
18 Reichley, Religion in American Public Life, 340. 
19 Philip Gorski, “Religious Pluralism and Democratic Inclusion: The 
American Recipe for Peace,” Society 51, no. 6 (December 2014): 632. 
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in order to protect the free choices of individuals with regards to their 
religious beliefs. Such neutrality-obsessed separation has rarely been 
questioned judicially.
20
 Beyond the judicial realm, Jefferson’s idea of 
a wall of separation between church and state construed as complete 
neutrality now has a firm presence in the American consciousness, a 
victory for the current form of separation.  
 
At the same time, liberal neutrality-obsessed separation has left the 
ability of American politics, law, and society to deal with matters of 
religion significantly wounded. This principle is nowhere more 
apparent than in the conflict between liberal neutral separation, which 
hinges on the freely choosing self, and the sense that many Americans 
still have of religious duty and obligation. These citizens do not hold 
their beliefs or behave as a result of completely free choice, and so a 
neutrality-obsessed government and court system will find it hard to 
ensure religious liberty for these Americans.21 The presence of 
difficulty in securing a basic liberty for citizens who feel bound by 
religious duty is a very serious problem, and it shows a flaw in 
current church-state separation, but it is not the only one. A new and 
ongoing conservative movement seeks to place religion in a public 
role similar to (or even greater than) the one it had in the early 
republic. This movement is commonly known as the Religious Right, 
and it poses a direct challenge to the very existence of neutrality-
obsessed separation, or possibly any form of separation. 
 
The greatest test of, or rather challenge to, modern neutrality-
obsessed church-state separation began in the 1980s when a period of 
awakening brought religion and religious ideals back to the public 
sphere after they had been somewhat bracketed in the preceding 
decades. Evangelical Protestants drove this new period of awakening, 
in a reversal of their previous stance towards the issue. Prior to the 
1950s, evangelicals largely supported church-state separation, but that 
support withered in the 1950s through the 1970s as a reaction to 
events ranging from the 1954 Brown case to the election of John F. 
                                                 
20 Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public 
Philosophy, 58–59, 63. 
21 Ibid., 65. 
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Kennedy and an assortment of school prayer and Bible study 
Supreme Court cases in the decades leading up to the 1980s.22 
Dissatisfied with the moral state of the country and its politics, 
evangelicals and others began to assert their consciences in American 
politics and culture, including through the political activities of 
ministers like Pat Robertson.23 This new political and religious 
movement, which persists to this day, came to be known as the 
Religious Right. 
 
By the time of Ronald Reagan’s presidency, this revivalist project 
thrived and has continued to do so since. At the core of this 
movement is the belief that the law of God should be enacted in 
America, and that believers ought to unleash their full arsenal of 
political tools to realize this vision.24 As the epilogue of his book 
Clear and Present Danger: Church and State in Post-Christian 
America, author William Stanmeyer writes “A Letter to a Christian 
Citizen,” virtually a manifesto of the new revivalism. Stanmeyer 
expresses the new revivalist dedication so clearly (and, in his 
fundamentalist devotion, so alarmingly), that he is worth quoting at 
length:  
Like an army sitting still, we become an easy target. If we do 
nothing about the economic, political, and legal rules that 
structure our public life and much of our private lives, we 
abandon those rules by default to the manipulation of people 
who have a theological agenda and a social vision hostile to 
our faith. We can no more stand aloof, above the fray, when 
“good” or “bad” laws are made than we could walk by on 
the other side of the road when we come upon a traveler 
beaten, robbed, and left half-dead in the ditch. We are called 
to intervene.25 
 
                                                 
22 Ragosta, “Federal Control: Jefferson’s Vision in Our Times,” 181. 
23 Edel, Defenders of the Faith: Religion and Politics from the Pilgrim 
Fathers to Ronald Reagan, 136. 
24 Ibid., 124. 
25 William A. Stanmeyer, Clear and Present Danger: Church and State in 
Post-Christian America (Ann Arbor: Servant Books, 1983), 194. 
Giles / Church and State 
 
33 
Of particular note in this passage is the metaphor Stanmeyer uses of 
America as a mauled traveler, drawn from the parable of the Good 
Samaritan. For Stanmeyer and other new revivalists, asserting 
religious beliefs in politics is about aiding an ailing entity. To them, it 
is a benevolent thing to do, but in fact their fundamentalist devotion 
to their beliefs poses a direct threat to both neutrality-obsessed 
church-state separation and democracy as a whole.26 
 
Yet, despite the problems posed by this ideology, it has had a 
significant impact on American politics. Those of religious conviction 
dominated (and still dominate) the pro-life movement and similar 
social movements.27 Court cases involving religious liberty, prayer in 
schools, religious expression in public spaces and institutions, and 
questions of the scope of both the Establishment and Free Exercise 
Clauses of the First Amendment are a frequent occurrence and they 
garner a great deal of public attention.28 Most alarmingly of all, the 
past twenty years have seen an expansion of legislative moves at the 
state level to bypass the federal government and the stricter neutrality 
practices there in order to enact laws friendlier to religion. Between 
1995 and 2009, various state legislatures around the country passed 
87 different laws along these lines.29 These laws are varied in both 
language and effects, but they nonetheless challenge the idea of a 
government whose role is limited with regards to religion. 
 
                                                 
26 Robert Brathwaite and Andrew Bramsen, “Reconceptualizing Church and 
State: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Separation of 
Religion and State on Democracy,” Politics & Religion 4, no. 2 (August 
2011): 233; Edel, Defenders of the Faith: Religion and Politics from the 
Pilgrim Fathers to Ronald Reagan, 137. 
27 Edel, Defenders of the Faith: Religion and Politics from the Pilgrim 
Fathers to Ronald Reagan, 128, 131; Gorski, “Religious Pluralism and 
Democratic Inclusion: The American Recipe for Peace,” 627. 
28 Ragosta, “Federal Control: Jefferson’s Vision in Our Times,” 169. 
29 Keith Gunnar Bentele et al., “Breaking Down the Wall between Church 
and State: State Adoption of Religious Inclusion Legislation, 1995-2009.,” 
Journal of Church and State 56, no. 3 (September 2014): 503–504, 508. 
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So it can be seen that the movement represented primarily by the 
Religious Right represents a significant breach in neutrality-obsessed 
church-state separation and presents that separation with its greatest 
challenge to date. The pervading church-state separation and the new 
revivalism are at an impasse. Both ideologies are opposed in such a 
way that they cannot seem to be able to agree on the proper 
relationship of religion to the state and culture.  
 
Yet, it is absolutely necessary to find a proper balanced relationship 
between church and state. The Founders correctly believed that 
religion could contribute to the formation of morals necessary in a 
good citizen. Indeed, in a time hostile to tradition, when these values 
that reinforce democracy can no longer rely on custom to persist, 
religion is more important than ever in its role as their incubator.30 In 
addition, there is no dismissing the power of religion in world affairs, 
and attempts to build the good society using purely secular means 
have been no more successful than attempts to do so using religious 
means. Religion, simply put, is here to stay, and it is a force that must 
be accounted for.
31
 
 
At the same time, government still must take caution in regards to 
religion, since there are dangers that come with giving religion too 
much power in society. Certain aspects of religion, especially their 
tendencies to make absolute truth claims, can be antithetical to 
democracy. These aspects are resistant to the democratic mindset, 
where consensus and compromise is key to successful governing, and 
it is virtually impossible to realize one’s full agenda.32  
 
Thus, we are left with a complex paradox that defies easy resolution. 
On the one hand, religion is crucial as an incubator for values and 
institutions that form the backbone of a democratic society, so it must 
be given at least some room. On the other hand, religion possesses the 
                                                 
30 Reichley, Religion in American Public Life, 348; Thomas G. Walsh, 
“Religion, Peace, and the Post-Secular Public Sphere,” International Journal 
on World Peace 29, no. 2 (June 2012): 44. 
31 Walsh, “Religion, Peace, and the Post-Secular Public Sphere,” 35–36, 59. 
32 Reichley, Religion in American Public Life, 348–349. 
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tendency to run wild in ways that could do more harm than good, so 
we must take care to check its power. Trying to balance these ideas 
with a greater emphasis on checking religion’s power has produced 
mixed results, so a new balance is needed. 
 
III. The Case for Greater Deference to Free Religious Exercise 
 
We have now demonstrated that contemporary neutrality-obsessed 
church-state separation is a flawed system, and while it may have a 
future, it does not deserve one. Therefore, we are left with the task of 
outlining a more effective way to construct our church-state 
separation. In doing so, we are presented with the challenge of 
properly balancing the duality of principles at the center of any 
church-state arrangement. 
 
The question at the core of the quest for an effective church-state 
separation is one enshrined in the two clauses of the First Amendment 
that pertain to religion: the Establishment Clause and the Free 
Exercise Clause. These two clauses reference two warring principles: 
democratic inclusion through the prevention of any governmental 
religious establishment and protection for religious exercise as well as 
the expression of religiously informed consciences through the Free 
Exercise Clause. These principles, when applied without restraint, are 
mutually exclusive. If an emphasis is placed only on democratic 
inclusion, then religious expression in both consciences and policy 
must be suppressed and kept out of any public processes to avoid 
exclusion. In a similar way, complete freedom of religious conscience 
facilitates the creation of policies and court rulings that clearly favor a 
specific belief set, thereby excluding entire sets of religious beliefs 
and morals, a practice neither desirable nor practical in a multicultural 
democratic society such as ours.  
 
Forming any relationship between church and state involves striking a 
balance between these two principles, and an optimal balance leans 
slightly in favor of religious conscience so that religion can be used to 
inculcate moral virtues that are beneficial to democracy while 
maintaining checks on religious conscience to allow government to 
function and prevent the establishment of a theocracy. However, even 
XJUR Vol. 4 (2016) 
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once such a relationship is established, it must be constantly 
reevaluated, as the freedom of religious expression can produce new 
variants of religions, and democratic inclusion changes with 
conceptions of citizenship.33 The final part of this paper will argue 
that giving greater favor to the freedom of religious exercise and 
religious conscience is a reliable solution for the current problems 
with church-state separation, but it is not to be taken as a permanent 
solution. 
 
The current liberal form of neutrality-obsessed church-state 
separation, to its detriment, places great emphasis on democratic 
inclusion as opposed to expression of religious conscience. This 
emphasis is based on the worry that giving religious conscience too 
much power in the state can work against democratic principles. Such 
a worry is not unfounded, since most of the world’s religions tend to 
make absolute truth claims along with claims that any other contrary 
doctrines from any other religious traditions are absolutely false. This 
viewpoint is antithetical to democracy in principle because 
democratic governing takes place as a result of deliberation and 
compromise; activities rendered irrelevant in the presence of absolute 
truth claims.34 The threat of this viewpoint is very real, as evidenced 
by the stances, actions, and popularity of the Religious Right, which 
seeks to make government legislation reflect Biblical moral teachings.  
 
In response to this threat, neutrality-obsessed separation greatly 
favors protecting democratic inclusion by seeking to keep religion 
and religious conviction bracketed from public life. However, even if 
this move was justified in creating an effective church-state 
separation, it fails to keep religion out of politics and public life. 
(Indeed, Gorski goes so far as to credit the emergence of the 
                                                 
33 Gorski, “Religious Pluralism and Democratic Inclusion: The American 
Recipe for Peace,” 634. 
34 Brathwaite and Bramsen, “Reconceptualizing Church and State: A 
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Separation of Religion 
and State on Democracy,” 233. 
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Religious Right to the prevalence of neutrality-obsessed separation.35) 
Since the role of a legislator is to represent a constituency and the 
viewpoints of those constituents, legislators from areas where the 
Religious Right has a strong presence can actually gain electoral 
benefits by bringing issues of church and state to the fore of 
legislative activity. Beyond the constituency scale, many recent 
Republican presidential candidates have had to cater to the Religious 
Right, since conservative evangelicals form a significant contingent 
of Republican primary voters that candidates need to win over for the 
Party’s nomination.36  
 
Further, neutrality-obsessed separation, by seeking to bracket religion 
from public life, stifles the good elements of religion for democracy 
by taking away key components of religious practice, leaving 
American religion too compromised to effectively perform its role as 
a moral incubator. Privatized American religion as it is now treated 
separates from its uses of ritual, place, and doctrine, elements that 
possess significant public and social aspects and are normally 
considered essential to a religion’s character.37 As for the beneficial 
role religion can play, Jefferson and many others saw it as a potent 
force for inculcating and sustaining moral virtue in citizens. Jefferson 
and Madison wanted a secular government with church-state 
separation, but they also clearly wanted a religiously engaged 
citizenry and government where religious convictions were common 
and frequently expressed.38 The difficulty we encounter is that many 
                                                 
35 Gorski, “Religious Pluralism and Democratic Inclusion: The American 
Recipe for Peace,” 624. 
36 Ted G. Jelen, “The Future of the Church-State Debate,” in To Serve God 
and Mammon: Church-State Relations in American Politics, 2nd ed. 
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2010), 136–137, 141. 
37 Gorski, “Religious Pluralism and Democratic Inclusion: The American 
Recipe for Peace,” 631. 
38 John Ragosta, “Federal Control: Jefferson’s Vision in Our Times,” in 
Religious Freedom: Jefferson’s Legacy, America’s Creed (Charlottesville: 
University of Virginia Press, 2013), 185–186, 188; A. James Reichley, 
Religion in American Public Life (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 
1985), 340. 
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of the moral virtues that Jefferson and Madison believed religion 
could cultivate and maintain are based in doctrine or tradition of some 
other form, elements that are now compromised in American religion, 
primarily due to its bracketing by neutrality-obsessed separation. 
 
It seems obvious, after tracing all of the faults in American religion as 
the result of a church-state separation that places a great emphasis on 
protecting democratic inclusion, that the metaphorical scales are in 
fact out of balance, and that they must be shifted to give slightly more 
favor to protecting religious conscience and religious exercise. 
Beyond simply attempting to alleviate some current problems 
American church-state separation faces, there are also other practical 
reasons for such a shift. First, American religion is becoming an 
increasingly decentralized and varied phenomenon. The advent of so-
called “New Age” spiritualities and individual spiritualities has 
introduced a great deal of subjectivity into American religion 
combined with an increasing distaste for established religions, leading 
to the point that American citizens now hold a plethora of different 
religious beliefs. Moreover, some of these beliefs are radically 
different from the Christianity that was historically prevalent in the 
country.39  
 
As the spectrum of American religion morphs and comes to 
encompass non-traditional belief systems, the number of de facto 
religious minorities in America grows. These minorities can be quite 
small, so small that they might be left out of the representative system 
or ostracized for what might be deemed bizarre or dangerous beliefs. 
Thus, the potential for exclusion from the democratic process grows 
with the decentralization of American religion, and so the government 
is obligated to intervene in some way, probably by becoming more 
accommodating to religious conscience. This ultimately means that 
free religious exercise may occasionally require government 
support,40 an egregious violation of neutrality-obsessed separation, 
but a necessary one if the state chooses to continue its rightful 
practice of ensuring equal participation in the democratic system. 
                                                 
39 Jelen, “The Future of the Church-State Debate,” 143. 
40 Ibid., 144. 
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Second, free religious exercise in principle requires that citizens be 
able to act on their religious consciences in arenas of public life. As 
stated before, religion exerts a powerful influence on beliefs and 
morals, in some cases being the primary or even sole influence in 
their formation. Citizens whose beliefs have been informed by a 
religious tradition often take these beliefs very seriously, therefore to 
bracket such beliefs or morals by virtue of their being based in 
religion is an act of exclusion against those who consciences were 
formed in a strongly religious context. As this paper has emphasized 
repeatedly, religious conscience must be checked, but pure neutrality-
obsessed separation has no such check, preferring to simply bracket 
religious conscience from public life. Free religious exercise simply 
cannot be protected when religious conscience is completely 
bracketed. 
 
What this paper has laid out is the need for a shift of emphasis and a 
rethinking of the way the United States conducts and conceives of its 
church-state separation. The liberal neutrality-obsessed separation 
born of American policy and jurisprudence since the end of World 
War II simply cannot stand, since it leaves American religion 
bracketed and too compromised to be of benefit. Religion, a potent 
force for the inculcation and preservation of first principles and civic 
virtues, is almost unable to perform this purpose because religious 
conscience and religion itself has been bracketed from American life 
and broken down, losing some of its crucial characteristics. What is 
needed is a fundamental shift in jurisprudence and government policy 
that will give more deference to religious conscience, but not to too 
great an extent. Such a shift will allow religious conscience and 
religious influence to return to the public sphere, where it can 
continue to work towards the purpose that Jefferson and many of the 
Founding Fathers wanted it to fulfill. While the circumstances in 
which Jefferson and the Founding Fathers thought about religion are 
long gone, their principles may still very well provide one of the best 
frameworks for church and state today. 
 
To be sure, a shift in values pertaining to American religion is a 
change that possesses a cultural facet as well as a governmental one, 
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rendering such a shift a difficult and likely time-consuming process. 
The processes that built neutrality-obsessed separation took decades, 
if not centuries, to unfold, and so it is realistic to expect their reversal 
to take at least as long. However, it is apparent after analyzing the 
flaws of neutrality-obsessed separation that such a change must occur, 
regardless of the time spent enacting it. At the same time, this change 
has many variables, and so the details are far too complex for a paper 
like this. Such questions will be debated by, researched, and argued 
over by policy experts, lawmakers, and judges for decades to come. 
 
Nevertheless, this shift is possible, but it remains important to keep in 
mind that the outline of a solution this paper proposes, while it is a 
good one that can work to fix many of neutrality-obsessed church-
state separation’s problems, cannot be expected to permanently solve 
the issue of church and state. The history of this relationship is a long 
and complex one, and if it possessed an easy solution, that solution 
would likely have been found by now. Due to the representative 
nature of politics and the myriad of public opinions concerning 
religion in the electorate, we can expect to see issues of religion come 
up repeatedly in the political process, since legislators and 
administrators representing these various beliefs about religion are 
bound to emerge over time. So, for the foreseeable future, the debate 
over church-state separation will continue as it has for centuries, if 
not millennia, with the scales holding the two competing principles of 
democratic inclusion and freedom of religious exercise and 
conscience moving back and forth. However, if American democracy 
hopes to collect the benefits from a religious citizenry while 
preserving the positive aspects of her democracy, the scales must tilt 
slightly more in favor of freedom of religious conscience in the end. 
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